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Abstract
We consider a principal-agent model in which a task, demanding a sequence of eﬀorts
by the agent, must be completed by a certain date. Eﬀort is not contractible. Agents are
subject to shocks aﬀecting their opportunity cost of time such that they are distracted
from work when the opportunity cost of time is high. We show that the probability
that a task is completed by the deadline is a non-monotonic function of the agent’s
probability of being distracted. The anticipation of future distractions induces rational
agents to get started earlier for precautionary reasons. As a result, agents who are more
often distracted may outperform agents who are distracted less often. Principals can
increase the probability that the task is completed, and thus achieve higher profits, by
strategically setting "tight" deadlines, provided that these can later be extended with a
positive probability.
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1 Introduction
Many situations are characterized by deadlines. Deadlines are usually associated with tasks
that take time to complete and such that failing to meet the deadline implies that all or a
substantial fraction of the eﬀort exerted up to that point is wasted. In principle, deadlines are
supposed to discipline the timing of agents’ eﬀort. However, for those of us who sometimes
get distracted from working, the risk of wasting eﬀort may make deadlines discouraging. In
fact, this is why we may fail to get started reading a long paper on a Friday afternoon. The
risk is overwhelming that we only get half way through because a colleague asks us to come
for a drink.
Distractions, whether in the form of a more acutely pressing task at work or a sick child
requiring a parent to stay at home from work, put the completion of the task at risk. We may
respond in diﬀerent ways to this risk. One possibility is that the risk of being distracted is so
large that we do not find it worthwhile to get started on the task at all. Another possibility
is that the presence of distractions actually helps and encourages us to get started reading
that paper right away on Friday morning. We know we had better work early, in case we get
distracted later, if we are ever to get through before we call the day.
Rational agents who discount future rewards and costs would tend to work as late as
possible, to finish just on time. However, when they are aware that they may get distracted
along the way, they trade oﬀ their aversion to work early with the desire to avoid failing to
meet the deadline because of later distractions.
There are numerous examples involving such trade oﬀ. Grant or job applications, sub-
mission of term and conference papers, reaching of sales targets to get bonus payments or
a contract to deliver a good or a service at some specific date are but a few. We can also
think of tenure decisions and probation periods in employment contracts as examples of such
deadlines. In all these examples, the task requires repeated eﬀorts over time and there is a
risk of being only half way through when the deadline expires.
There is evidence that distractions and the time consuming nature of some tasks are
important determinants of when people get started. Being distracted by too many other things
to do is the most frequently stated reason for academic procrastination and failure to meet
deadlines according to Solomon and Ruthblum (1984). Moreover, Boice (1989) documents
that it is because some tasks, e.g. academic writing, are perceived as requiring long periods
of work that researchers view themselves too busy to get their writing going.
The first objective of this paper is to analyze how occasional distractions aﬀect the timing
of work on tasks that require the agents full attention for more than one period in the presence
of deadlines.
We find a non-monotonic relation between distractions and the probability that tasks are
completed. In some cases agents who are subject to more frequent distractions are actually
more likely to finish the job than agents who are less easily distracted. Of course this is not
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always true. Agents who are never distracted, always carry out the task at the last moment
and always complete. Agents who are distracted most of the time never even get started. The
interesting result arises for moderate likelihoods of being distracted when the risk of being
distracted induces precautionary eﬀort. By getting started early, agents who are distracted
more frequently complete the task more often than agents who are less frequently distracted
and therefore do not exert any precautionary eﬀort.
There is ample evidence in the real world of deadlines that get extended, or simply bro-
ken.1 Some deadline contracts even specify explicit conditions for the possible extensions.
Apart from examples concerning compliance with regulations, and delivery of commentaries
or advice, there are uncountable announcements of extended deadlines for submission of pa-
pers to academic congresses or submissions of candidates for various prizes or for submitting
tenders.2
This observation brings us to the second result of the paper. We show that principals deal-
ing with rational agents who are subject to preference shocks, or distractions that increase the
opportunity cost of their time, may find it optimal to set stochastic deadlines. In particular,
suppose that a task must be completed by time T . The principal may increase the probability
that the job is done by setting a deadline which is one period shorter, while retaining the
option to extend it for one more period with positive (but less than unit) probability. We
refer to such shorter deadlines as a "tight" deadlines. Tight deadlines are valuable since they
encourage the agent to start earlier for precautionary reasons. However, stochastic extensions
are also useful as they reduce the probability that projects are first started and then aban-
doned due to a sequence of distractions. Our result requires that principals be able to commit
to stochastic termination. If the principal could renegotiate the contract ex-post, he would
always grant, the extension, and no tight deadline will ever be credible. However, in many
instances, the circumstances or procedures may partially tie the principal’s hands. It may,
for instance, be diﬃcult, though not impossible, to call for an extraordinary board meeting.
Our paper shows that this type of uncertainty due to imperfect commitment on the part of
the principal may be beneficial and lead to better outcomes than both full commitments and
total lack of it.
Our theory can explain in a rational choice framework why deadlines are first imposed, but
then often extended, postponed or broken and why in some instances, agents are not granted
maximal time at the outset. Our explanation contrasts with that in O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999) who argue that tight deadlines can only be optimal if agents have time-inconsistent
1For example, in April 2003, the Europeean Commission granted an extension of deadline to the CESR
(Committee of European Securities Regulators) to deliver technical advice on implementing measures for a
directive, and in December 2001, the US Congress extended the deadline to comply with the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Transactions and Code Sets requirements. See also Toxvaerd
(2006) for a review of evidence on more or less systematic time over runs in a number of industries.
2In fact, a google-search for "Extension of the deadline" gave some 182000 hits in January 2007.
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preferences. In their framework, tight deadlines can help agents overcome their self-control
problems. However, they claim that if agents are time-consistent granting maximal time at
the outset is optimal. Counter to this claim, our results show that this is not the case when
agents are sometimes distracted.
Our paper is also related to Fischer (2001) and Toxvaerd (2006; 2007). Fischer models
time as an exhaustible resource and studies the optimal allocation between eﬀort and leisure
when agents face a deadline. Her focus is not on distractions but on the eﬀect of impatience on
procrastination. She shows that high rates of time preference lead to dynamically consistent
procrastination which manifests itself in increasing workloads. When the task involves more
than one stage, and there is uncertainty concerning the workload needed to finish the diﬀerent
stages, more impatient agents may optimally decide to give up. Toxvaerd (2006) analyses
project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build and
discounting. In his model, the agent must complete a number of sub-projects in a prespecified
order. The success in each sub-project depends on the eﬀort exerted. Ineﬃcient delays can be
ameliorated by long-term contracts under which the agent is rewarded along the way. Current
wages and future rewards based on success reinforce each other in providing incentives to the
agent. Toxvaerd (2007) analyses the optimal deadline contract when there is time to build
and adverse selection because agents diﬀer in eﬃciency. Deadlines are used as a screening
device and the optimal contract features ineﬃcient delays. As in Fischer, the agent’s eﬀort
is strictly increasing over time, which we shall see is not necessarily the case in this paper.
Instead, we find that the agent may find it optimal to get started on a task and then take a
brake, and postpone the completion of the project.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we introduce a simple decision theoretic model
of an agent working against a deadline. We analyze how timing of eﬀort and probability of
completion depend on the likelihood of being distracted and on the length of the deadline.
In section 3, we embed the model in a principal-agent framework, letting the deadline regime
be chosen by a principal. We discuss the conditions under which setting and extending or
postponing deadlines is in the interest of the principal. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We construct a discrete-time model where a principal has a project that must be completed
within a deadline. The principal must delegate the project to an agent with specialized skills,
and this raises a standard agency problem. The project takes time to complete. More precisely,
the agent must spend two full time periods on the project, although the two periods need not
be consecutive. In every period, the agent’s opportunity cost is high, u, with probability p and
low, u, with probability (1− p). When the opportunity cost is high, the agent is "distracted"
from work. The source of fluctuation could be either that agents are occasionally oﬀered other
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more lucrative projects or that agents are unable to work on the project because of illness or
other reasons preventing them from working.
Any eﬀort by the agent has a relation-specific value with no return outside the specific
principal-agent relation. A completed venture, however, generates a total value W > 0 which
can be realized at time T . A project completed ahead of the deadline can be stored at zero cost
until its value is realized at time T . The contractual environment is characterized by severe
imperfections. First, we assume that the value W is split according to ex-post bargaining at
T resulting in the payoﬀ B to the agent and (W −B) to the principal. As a result, B is taken
as given. Second, the costs associated with monitoring and verifying the agent’s progress are
prohibitively high, so the principal can only commit to rewarding the agent B at T for a task
completed within a stipulated deadline T . We relax these assumption in section 3.2.
2.1 The agent’s decision
For an agent to meet the deadline at T and obtain the reward B, the last opportunity to
complete the project is on the eve of T , i.e. at t = T − 1. In each period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1,
the agent decides whether to work or not after observing the realization of his opportunity
cost. The decision to work depends on whether the agent has worked before or not, on the
realization of the opportunity cost ut ∈ {u, u} and on the number of periods left before the
deadline expires (T − t). We assume the agent to be rational and to maximize the present
discounted expected utility. We assume that the agent discounts the future exponentially, i.e.
he is time consistent.
We start first with the decision to complete an already started project. Note that the
decision to complete a task is equivalent to the decision to undertake a project that requires
only one period of eﬀort.
The decision to complete.
Consider first an agent who has already worked one period and arrives at the eve of the
deadline without having completed. He will complete the project if the discounted payoﬀ to
meeting the deadline outweighs the opportunity cost of working, i.e., if
δB ≥ uT−1, (1)
where uT−1 ∈ {u, u}, and δ ∈ (0, 1] is the agent’s discount factor.
Since the focus of the analysis is on the agent’s timing of eﬀort, and on the probability of
completing the task when there is competition for his time or attention, we assume that this
competition is fierce in one particular respect: The agent never works on the deadlined task
when the opportunity cost of time is high. However, the project is worth completing when he
is not distracted. Throughout the paper we therefore maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 1: δB ∈ [u, u).
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Under this assumption the agent never works when ut = u. Given that a distracted agent
never works, we can focus on the determinants of the agent’s decision to work or not conditional
on the opportunity cost being low.
Consider an agent who is distracted with probability p and let cT−t(p) denote the value of
the project that makes him indiﬀerent between completing at t and postponing completion.
The subscript T − t indicates the number of remaining periods before the deadline expires.
Provided that the opportunity cost is low, the agent completes the project k periods ahead
of the deadline only if B ≥ ck(p). Whenever B < ck(p) the agent postpones completion. The
condition, ck(p), depends on the agents willingness to complete in later periods i.e. on cτ (p),
τ < k. The following proposition characterizes the complete conditions ck(p), k = 1, 2, ...
Proposition 1 The agent is willing to complete k periods ahead of the deadline if B ≥ ck(p),
where
ck(p) =
u
δkpk−1
(1− (1− p)δp− (δp)
k
p(1− δp) ),
i) ck+1(p) > ck(p) for all k = 1, 2, ...
ii) c1(p) = u/δ, and for k ≥ 2, limp→0 ck(p) =∞, c0k(p) < 0, and ck(1) = u/δk.
Proof. See appendix
Part i) of Proposition 1 establishes that an agent who is willing to complete a task k periods
ahead of the deadline, is also willing to complete the task as the deadline approaches. Part ii)
establishes that an agent who is never distracted (p = 0) always postpones completion until the
eve of the deadline and that the more distracted the agent (higher p), the lower the payment
needed to induce early completion. Proposition 1 also implies that, given p and B ≥ u/δ,
there is a critical threshold kc(p,B) ≥ 1, such that the agent prefers to postpone completion
if there remain more than kc(p,B) periods before the deadline expires, but completes at the
first realization of low opportunity cost if there are kc(p,B) or fewer periods left, i.e. when
t ≥ T − kc(p,B). Figure 1 illustrates the optimal decision to complete.
wait complete
),( BpkT c− 2−T 1−T T0
Figure 1: The decision to complete
The decision to start.
We proceed to analyze the decision to get started on a project that requires two periods
of eﬀort. This decision depends on both future start and future complete conditions. We first
illustrate the derivation for k = T − 2, and then obtain a general expression.
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The last period the agent may consider to start is T − 2. Under Assumption 1, the agent
knows that if he starts at T−2 he completes at T−1, provided that he does not get distracted.
He therefore starts at t = T−2 if the opportunity cost of time is low and
δ2 (1− p)B + δpu¯ ≥ u+ δ(pu+ (1− p)u). (2)
Note that, because the agent never works when the opportunity cost of time is high, all
conditions to work depend only on p, δ,B and u , while terms in u¯ cancel out. The inequality
in (2) can be rewritten as the following start condition:
B ≥ u
δ2
1 + (1− p)δ
(1− p) = s2(p), (3)
i.e. the reward required to make the agent to start when the deadline is two periods away. It is
easy to see that s2(p) is increasing in p, moreover, s2(p) > u/δ for all p and limp→1 s2(p) =∞.
This implies that the higher the likelihood of being distracted, the higher is the reward needed
to induce the agent to start working in the project. Since s2(p) > u/δ, the agent is only willing
to start at T−2 if he is certain to complete at T−1, given a low opportunity cost. We can now
obtain the probability of meeting a deadline which is two periods away, π2(p,B). The project
is undertaken and completed only if the agent has two consecutive periods of low opportunity
cost of time and the payoﬀ, B, is high enough, namely
π2(p,B) =
½
0 if B < s2(p)
(1− p)2 if B ≥ s2(p).
(4)
B
s2HpL
c2HpL
.a b.
u¯ccccδ
Figure 2: Start and complete conditions for k = 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the start and complete conditions when the deadline is two periods
away, s2(p) and c2(p), and c1(p) = u/δ. In periods of low opportunity cost, the agent only
starts (completes) two periods ahead of the deadline when the pairs (p,B) lie on or above
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s2(p) (c2(p)). For instance for (p,B) = a, the agent starts the project, but takes a break (i.e.
postpones completion) if the project is already under way. Instead, for (p,B) = b, the agent
is not willing to start, but completes early if the project is already under way. Note that the
more easily distracted the agent, the more willing is the agent to complete the task ahead of
the deadline, but the less willing is the agent to get started.
Now, consider the decision to start k periods ahead of the deadline. Let sT−t(p) denote the
start condition at time t when the deadline is at T . As before, the subscript T − t indicates
the number of periods remaining before the deadline expires. The start condition sk(p) gives
the reward that makes the agent indiﬀerent between starting at T − k and not starting. It
depends on both future complete and future start conditions, since the agent must compare
the consequences of getting started immediately with the consequences of postponing start,
taking into account future behavior.
The following lemma and its corollary establishes important intermediate results that are
useful for characterizing the general start condition.
Lemma 1 If the agent is willing to start k + 1 and k − 1 periods ahead of the deadline then,
he also wants to start k periods ahead, i.e., sk(p) ≤ max{sk−1(p), sk+1(p)} for all p and k.
Proof. See appendix
Corollary For all k = 2, 3...
i) if sk+1(p) ≥ sk(p) then sk+2(p) > sk+1(p), and
ii) if sk+2(p) ≤ sk+1(p) then sk+1(p) < sk(p).
Lemma 1 implies that, conditional on ever starting, i.e. B ≥ sk(p) for some k, the set of
subsequent periods in which the agent is willing to start is either empty, i.e. sτ(p) > B for
all τ < k, or an interval, i.e. sτ (p) ≤ B for τ = k − 1, ., k − j for some j ∈ {1, .., k − 2}. It
is therefore the case that for all (p,B) such that B ≥ sk(p) for some k, there are two critical
threshold values, ks(p,B) and k¯s(p,B) (where ks(p,B) < k¯s(p,B)), such that the agent is
willing to get started on the project only if the number of periods ahead of the deadline is
between (and including) the thresholds. Figure 3 illustrates the optimal starting decision. If
the deadline is too far oﬀ, T > k¯s(p,B), the agent postpones start until k¯s(p,B) or fewer
periods remain, but if the agent has not started by T − ks(p,B), he never will.
T1−T2−T),( BpkT s−),( BpkT s−
start startneverwait
0
Figure 3: The decision to start
Before we can characterize the general start condition, Lemma 2 establishes a useful rela-
tion between the earliest period in which the agent is willing to complete the task kc(p,B),
and the last period in which he would want to start, ks(p,B).
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Lemma 2 kc(p,B) ≥ ks(p,B)− 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2 implies that if T − t is the last period the agent wants to start, then he wants
to complete at the first opportunity. Making use of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we now obtain
the condition sk(p) that makes the agent indiﬀerent between starting and postponing start
when the deadline is k periods away, taking into account that he will behave optimally in the
future. The following proposition summarizes the properties of sk(p).
Proposition 2 The agent is willing to start k periods before the deadline if B ≥ sk(p), where
(i) s2(p) is increasing in p, s2(0) = u/δ2, and limp→1 s2(p) =∞;
(ii) for all k ≥ 3, sk(p) is U−shaped, limp→0 sk(p) =∞, and limp→1 sk(p) =∞; and
(iii) sk(p) > sk−1(p) for all p if δ ≤ 1/2, otherwise sk(p) < sk−1(p) for large p’s provided
δ > (k − 2)/(k − 1).
Proof. See appendix.
We illustrate the results in Propositions 1 and 2 in Figure 4, where we have depicted the
start conditions with solid lines for k = 2 (black), 3 (dark gray), 4 (medium gray) and 5 (light
gray). We have also plotted the complete conditions for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (dashed lines). An agent
is willing to start (complete) the task k periods ahead of the deadline for all combinations of
parameters (p,B) lying above sk(p) (ck(p)). Else, he prefers not to start (complete).
p
B
s2HpL
s3HpL
c2HpL c3HpL
c4HpL
s4HpL
s5HpL
u¯ccccδ
Figure 4. Start conditions for k = 2, 3, 4, 5 complete conditions for k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
First, as shown by Proposition 1, the payoﬀ required to complete a task under way is
lower the closer the deadline and the more frequently distracted the agent. The reason is that
delaying completion jeopardizes the possibility of meeting of the deadline. Second, agents who
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are never distracted always postpone eﬀort until the last period: when the deadline is more
than two periods (one period) ahead, the start (complete) condition goes to infinity as p goes
to 0. Third, agents who get distracted most of the time (high p), never get started. Hence,
for a given deadline and a given payoﬀ, the rarely distracted and the often distracted are
least willing to get started although for diﬀerent reasons. The rarely distracted are reluctant
to start because due to discounting they prefer to postpone since they are sure to complete
anyway. The very distracted are instead reluctant to start because the risk of failing to meet
the deadline is so high that they do not find it worthy to sink one period of eﬀort. It is worth
noting that two start conditions cross once, if at all.
Figure 4 also illustrates the possibility of breaks. It can be shown that when k > 2+δ−1 >
3, the optimal number of breaks is positive for some values (p,B). In the example depicted in
Figure 4, the start condition s4(p) (s5(p)), and the complete condition for c3(p) (c4(p)), cross.
For values of p and B below c3(p) (c4(p)) and above s4(p) (s5(p)), an agent who gets started at
T − 4 (T − 5), will take a break at T − 3 (T − 4) and complete at first opportunity from T − 2
(T − 3) onwards. An intuition for this result is that getting started early is an investment
in the probability of completing. Since the deadline is still far ahead, an agent who is only
moderately distracted is willing to grant himself a break as long as this does not compromise
the probability of completing enough to outweigh the break’s implied earlier enjoyment of
leisure utility in times of low opportunity cost of time, u. Agents who are more distracted
also get started early, but they do not take breaks.
2.2 Getting the task done
We now turn to how the likelihood of being distracted aﬀects the probability that an agent
completes a task. We compute the ex-ante probability, at time zero, that agents with diﬀerent
p’s complete a task with a deadline T periods later. The agent starts in the first period if
the opportunity cost is low and B ≥ sT (p). Then, the probability of completion, depends on
whether the agent takes breaks or not. The agent completes without breaks if B ≥ cT−1(p)
and takes breaks if B < cT−1(p). If the opportunity cost of time happens to be high in the
first period or if B < sT (p), then the probability of completing the task is the same as if
the deadline had been one period closer. Hence, for T ≥ 3 we can write the probability of
completing the task as:
π∗T (p,B) =
(
π∗T−k¯s(p,B)(p,B) if T > k¯
s(p,B)
p π∗T−1(p,B) + (1− p)(1− pmin{T−1,k
c(p,B)}) if T ≤ k¯s(p,B)
, (5)
where min{T − 1, kc(p,B)} is the number of periods in which the agent is willing to complete
the task, provided that he started T periods ahead of the deadline, and where π∗2(p,B), is
given by(4). Proposition 3 characterizes how the probability of completion in Equation (5),
depends on B, p, and T .
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Proposition 3 Assume B ≥ sk(p) for some k ≤ T , then
i) π∗T (p,B) ≥ π∗T−1(p,B) for any T ;
ii) the probability of completion π∗T (p,B) is an increasing step function of B;
iii) π∗T (p,B) is piecewise decreasing in p, and for T ≥ 3, π∗T (p,B) exhibits a finite number of
upward discontinuities, provided B ≥ sk(p) for some p and some k > 2.
Proof. See appendix
Proposition 3 shows that increasing the length of the deadline, or the payoﬀ, to the agent
never reduces the probability of completion. Proposition 3 also implies that agents with higher
levels of distraction (higher p) can have higher success rates than agents who are less likely
to be distracted, provided that the risk of being distracted makes them start working on the
task earlier. This important result is illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows, for a given B, how the probability of completion, π∗T (p, B), changes with
the length of the deadline, T, and with p. The thin solid line is π∗2(p,B), the thin dashed line
is π∗3(p,B) and the thick dashed line is π∗4(p,B).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 p
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
πT∗Hp,BL
Figure 5: Probability of completion for T = 2, 3, 4 as a function of p.
Adding time, makes no diﬀerence to those who are only rarely distracted (p close to 0).
They never start working until two periods before the deadline. Instead, granting longer
deadlines matters as p increases, since more distracted agents find it optimal to get started
right away. Given T > 2, the probability of completion exhibits upwards jumps at those p’s
that encourage immediate start. Note that for T = 3, there is only one upward jump at the p
which encourages starting three periods before the deadline while for T = 4, there is second
upward jump at the p that encourages start four periods before the deadline.
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3 The principal’s decision
We now proceed to the principals decision to set a deadline for the venture, taking the behavior
of the agent as given. LetW be the joint surplus of the project and assume that it can only be
realized at Tˆ . The strategy of the principal consists of a deadline at T ≤ Tˆ , given a payment
to the agent B < W . The present discounted expected profit of the principal, Π(T,B), is
Π(T,B) = (δTˆW − δTB)π∗T (p,B) (6)
where δTˆW−δTB is the present value of the principal’s surplus and π∗T (p,B) is the probability
that the agent completes the project.
Proposition 3 implies that Π(T,B) ≤ Π(Tˆ , B) for all T < Tˆ . The probability of completion
is non-decreasing in the time horizon, and allowing for maximal time maximizes the principal’s
payoﬀ. This result is consistent with O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) who argue that time-
consistent agents should be granted maximal time. However, in our model with "distracted"
agents, the result only holds if deadlines are set deterministically. The non-monotonicity in the
probability of completion discussed in the previous section, suggests that it would be possible
to improve the probability of completion further if the principal could somehow induce an agent
to get started earlier. In what follows, we show that if principals can introduce uncertainty
about the length of the deadline, they may find it optimal, contrary to O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999), to set an initial deadline tighter than that imposed by nature.
3.1 Stochastic deadlines
We introduce the possibility of setting stochastic deadlines. We say that the principal sets
a stochastic deadline at T if he initially sets period T − 1 as the "tight" deadline for the
project, but that he when the tight deadline expires extends the deadline to T with some
predetermined positive probability q ∈ [0, 1]. We refer to the deadline at T as the "natural"
deadline, since T is the period in which the value of the project can be realized, and to the
deadline at T−1 as the "tight" deadline. We assume that the uncertainty about the extension
is resolved at T − 1, so that tasks under way may not be completed if the true deadline turns
out to be tight. As in previous sections, we assume that the value of the project, W , can only
be realized at T, and that B is the resulting payment to the agent if the two parties were to
bargain over the surplus at T .3 In what follows, we characterize the agent’s conditions for
starting and completing the task under a stochastic deadline.
The decision to complete.
3The same qualitative results follow if we assume that the principal anticipates the payment to the agent.
However, the chosen specification is analytically simpler, and allows us to focus only on the eﬀect of the
uncertainty on the probability of success, abstracting from additional incentives due to earlier payments.
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Let cST−t(p, q) denote the complete condition at t, when the deadline is stochastic at T
and the probability of extension of the deadline is q ∈ [0, 1]. Assume first that t = T − 1 and
that the deadline is extended, then the relevant conditions for completing is the one obtained
in the deterministic case when the deadline is one period away. The agent only considers
working if he has worked once, the opportunity cost is low and δB ≥ u (assumption 1). In
the appendix we derive a general condition for cST−t(p, q). The results are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 The agent is willing to complete the task T − k periods before the stochastic
deadline at T when
B ≥ p ck(p)
1− (1− p)q +
(1− q)(1− p)u
δ(1− (1− p)q) = c
S
k (p, q), where
i) cSk (p, 1) = ck(p), c
S
k (p, 0) = ck−1(p)/δ, and
ii) ∂cSk (p, q)/∂q > 0, c
S
k+1(p, q) > c
S
k (p, q) for all p.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 4 shows that a stochastic deadline at T makes the agent more willing to
complete the task relative to the deterministic deadline at T . As was the case under a
deterministic deadline, the agent willing to complete at a certain period is also willing to
complete in all subsequent periods.
The decision to start.
Let sST−t(p, q) denote the start conditions at t, when the deadline is stochastic at T. First,
consider the decision to start at at T − 2. The agent knows that if he starts at T − 2 he has a
chance to complete the task only if the deadline is extended, and the opportunity cost is low.
The agent will thus decide to start at T − 2 when
(1− p)qδ2B + (1− p)(1− q)δu ≥ u+ δ(1− p)u,
which can be re-written as
B ≥ u
δ2
1 + (1− p)qδ
(1− p)q = s
S
2 (p, q). (7)
Proposition 4 and (7) imply that the threat of a tight deadline makes the agent less willing
to start at T − 2, but increases the agent’s willingness to complete, much in the same way
as an increase in the probability of distraction. Now, it is straight forward to compute the
probability of completing a task when the deadline is stochastic at 2:
πS2 (p, q,B) =
½
0 if B < sS2 (p, q)
q(1− p)2 if B ≥ sS2 (p, q).
(8)
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A stochastic deadline two periods away, clearly, gives a lower probability of completion than
a deterministic deadline of the same length. However, as we move further ahead of the
deadline, by proposition 4, the eﬀect of the stochastic deadline is to make the agent more
willing to complete ahead of the deadline compared to a deterministic deadline. This increased
willingness to complete has implications for the decision to start. In the appendix we derive
the general start condition sST−t(p, q) when the deadline is stochastic at T . Lemma 3 shows
that the eﬀect on the decision to start, sk, of introducing a stochastic deadline depends only
on the relation between the last period the agent wants to start and the first period after k
in which he wants to finish.
Lemma 3 A stochastic deadline makes the agent more willing to start k periods before the
deadline, relative to the deterministic deadline, if
p <
mk(p)− nk(p) + 1
mk(p)− nk(p) + 2
∈ [0, 1),
where mk(p) = min{k− 1, kc(p, sk(p))} and nk(p) = ks(p, sk(p)). Otherwise the agent is more
willing to start with the deterministic deadline.
Proof. See appendix
Lemma 3 allows us to formulate the following proposition regarding the eﬀect of stochastic
deadlines on the decision to get started.
Proposition 5 For k ≥ 3, the introduction of stochastic deadlines encourages start for small
p’s and discourages start for large p’s.
Proof. See Appendix.
The findings for behavior under stochastic deadlines are illustrated in Figure 6. The
U-shaped lines in the figure are the start conditions. The black curve corresponds to the
deterministic deadline at 4, s4(p), and the gray line to a stochastic deadline at 4 with proba-
bility of extension q = 0.5, cS4 (p, 0.5). The decreasing functions are the complete conditions for
k = 3. The dashed black line corresponds to the deterministic deadline, c3(p), and the dashed
gray line to the stochastic deadline, cS3 (p, 0.5). Note that the agent is more (less) willing to
start for small (large) p’s with the stochastic deadline and more willing to complete for any p.
The reason is that for low levels of distraction, the threat of a tight deadline will, in fact, make
the agent more willing to get started early for precautionary motives. However, for high levels
of distraction, chances of completing are already low and the threat of a tight deadline makes
completion even less likely. As a result, the agent is discouraged from starting altogether.
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Figure 6: Start (k = 4) and complete conditions (k = 3) with stochastic and deterministic
deadlines.
3.2 Maximizing profits
It is clear from Equation (6) that the principal’s profits, for a given payment to the agent, B,
increase with the probability of completion. It is also clear from Proposition 3 that increases
in the payoﬀ to the agent, while costly to the principal, do not increase the probability of
completion unless the increase is large enough to aﬀect the agent’s work behavior. The above
analysis, however, shows that a stochastic deadline can improve the probability of completion
by inducing the agent to start early with no need of increasing payment B. When the principal
can set q, his profits are
Π(T, q) = δT (W −B)πST (p, q,B), (9)
where πST (p, q, B) is the probability of completion under a stochastic deadline at T.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
πT,πTs
Figure 7: Probability of completion with stochastic and deterministic deadlines (T=4).
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Figure 7 shows the probabilities of completion under a deterministic deadline at 4 (solid
line) and a stochastic deadline at 4 (dashed line). The stochastic deadline results in a higher
probability of completion for small and intermediate values of p. This is the range of the
probability of distraction for which the agent is willing to start one period earlier with the
stochastic deadline. In particular the agent starts at T −3 (in addition to only at T −2) when
p is small and at T − 4 (in addition to only at T − 3) for intermediate p’s. Note that when
the stochastic deadline does not induce earlier start, the "natural" deadline is better than the
stochastic deadline.
This observation is formalized in Proposition 6, which states that a stochastic deadline may
be better than the "natural" deadline, provided that the former induces earlier start. Although
the stochastic deadline is, by construction, a convex combination of two deterministic regimes,
its outcome is not. The reason is that the stochastic deadline for a range of p’s can achieve
early undertaking in the same way as the tight deadline. The stochastic deadline, however,
does not leave as many started tasks uncompleted as the tight, but deterministic, deadline
does. Because the event of an extension allows agents to work on the task also in the last
period before the natural deadline expires, more tasks get completed. The stochastic deadline
improves also upon the natural deadline, precisely because it encourages early undertaking.
It does so even if some tasks are left unfinished in the event that the tight deadline does not
get extended. The reason is that the gain due to increased likelihood that the project gets
started is greater than the loss in rate of completion when the deadline is not extended.
Proposition 6 Assume that T ≥ 3. πT (p, q,B) > πT (p,B) whenever the stochastic deadline
induces earlier start than the deterministic deadline.
Proof. See appendix
It follows immediately from proposition 6 that for some levels of distraction, p, and for a
given payment to the agent, the principal can achieve higher profits, compared to granting
maximal time, if he is able to commit to a stochastic deadline which induces the agent to
get started early. This result rests on the assumption that the payment cannot be made
contingent on the date of completion and that payment to the agent is determined by some
unmodelled ex-post bargaining. In what follows, we show by means of two examples that
stochastic deadlines can be more profitable than deterministic ones, also under less restrictive
assumptions regarding payments. In particular, we explore the principal’s incentive to impose
a stochastic deadline when (i) the principal can also choose the payment to the agent and (ii)
when a fraction of the fixed B can be paid upon completion, rather than at the deadline.
The first example, depicted in Figure 8, explores the possibility that principals set B and
q jointly to maximize expected profits. Panel panel i) shows, for each q ∈ [0, 1], the minimum
payment that gives the agent the incentives to start k (k = 2, 3, 4) periods before a deadline
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set at 4, i.e; sSk (p, q). The thick line corresponds to k = 4, the dashed line to k = 3 and the
dotted line to k = 2. Panel ii) depicts the principal’s profits under those payments. The
highest profit is reached at q = q∗1: the principal chooses q so that sS4 (p, q) = sS3 (p, q). For
smaller q0s it is easier to induce the agent to start 4 periods before the deadline than 3 periods
before, the opposite is true for larger q0s. To induce the agent to start 2 periods ahead of the
deadline is only worthwhile when q is close to 1.
q
¤ iiL
q∗ 1
» »
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
q
sks iL
Figure 8: i) Payments ssk(p, q), k = 2, 3, 4 ( p=0.35). ii) Corresponding profits with a
stochastic deadline at T = 4.
Figure 9 shows that a stochastic deadline can be superior to a deterministic deadline also
when advance payments are allowed. We assume that the reward B is fixed, but as an alter-
native to imposing a stochastic deadline at T, we allow the principal to pay αB (α ∈ [0, 1])
upon completion. The remainder (1 − α)B is paid at the deadline T . We have chosen the
parameters such that the agent would start the second and third period (k = 2, 3) but not
the first (k = 4) if the deadline were deterministic at 4 (i.e; q = 1). In the horizontal axis
we have both q and α.The thick line shows how profits change with q (with α = 0, i.e, no
advance payments). The maximum is reached at q = q∗. For such probability of extension,
the agent is willing to start the first period (k = 4). The thin line depicts profits as a function
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of the share of advance payments, α (with q = 1, i.e, deterministic deadline). The maximum
is reached at α = α∗. For such share, agents start also the first period. As the fraction oﬀered
in advance payment increases beyond α∗, the present discounted value of profits decline.
q,α
¤
q∗ 1
»»
α∗
»
Figure 9: Stochastic deadlines vs deterministic deadlines with advance payments, T=4,
p=0.2.
4 Conclusion
We have studied the timing of eﬀort and the probability of completing a task which is carried
out by time-consistent agents who are occasionally distracted and prevented from working.
Our first result is that, given the length of the deadline, agents who are more frequently
distracted may complete with higher probability than a agents who are less likely to be dis-
tracted. The intuition for this result is that the former start working earlier for precautionary
motives.
Furthermore, our analysis has shown that although stochastic deadlines are by construction
a convex combination of deterministic deadlines, the resulting probability of completion is not.
The probability of completion with stochastic deadlines dominates both "tight" and "natural"
deadlines whenever the threat of a tighter deadline encourages the agent to get started earlier.
In the light of this result, there is no need to invoke time-inconsistency to understand why
setters of many real world deadlines set deadlines tighter than those imposed by nature and
that they occasionally extend the deadlines they originally set.
Understanding how deadlines and distractions aﬀect how agents trade oﬀ the probability
of completing against the desire to postpone eﬀort is of interest to setters of deadlines, be it
contractors, employers or grant funders who are concerned with timely completion of tasks.
our results indicate that it may be beneficial for principals to invest in structures and routines
that are reasonably, but not completely, flexible such that commitment to tight deadlines is
imperfect.
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Throughout this paper we have assumed that there is no cost in spreading the two periods
needed to complete the task. An extension incorporating the possibility of depreciation of the
work carried out the first period is equivalent to introducing a deadline within the original
deadline. We conjecture that the qualitative results will remain unchanged and that for
high enough payments, the agent may be willing to re-start in case the initial investment
is lost. Another route for future research is to investigate optimal deadline regimes when
principals have an imperfect knowledge of the agents’ probability of distraction. These and
other extensions are left for future research.
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5 Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that there exist no k > 1 such that T − k is the last
period the agent wants to complete. First, assume that this is not the case and that T − k is
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the last period the agent wants to complete. Then
Fk(p,B) = δkB +
k−1X
i=1
δi(1− p)u ≥ u+
k−1X
i=1
δi(1− p)u (10)
which can written as
B ≥ u
δk
. (11)
If (11) holds for some k¯ ≥ 2, then it also holds for any k = 1, 2, ..., k¯ − 1. Using this, we now
derive the complete condition when the deadline is k periods ahead, ck(p). Assume first that
the agent wants to complete in k − 1, ..., 1 periods ahead of the deadline, i.e. B ≥ ck−i(p) for
i = 1, 2, ..., k − 1. The agent will complete k periods ahead of the deadline, given that he will
finish at the first opportunity thereafter, when
Fk(p,B) ≥ u+
k−1X
i=1
δipi−1(1− p)Fk−i(p,B) (12)
= u+ δGk−1(p)u+ δkB(1− pk−1),
where
Gt(p)u =
t−1X
i=0
δipi(1− p)
t−i−1X
z=1
δz(1− p)u (13)
is the leisure utility enjoyed after completion. Solving for B, the agent will complete whenever
B ≥ u
δkpk−1
(1 + δGk−1(p)−
k−1X
i=1
δi(1− p)) = ck(p). (14)
Expanding the terms in the RHS of (14), we obtain
ck(p) =
u
δkpk−1
(1− (1− p)δp− (δp)
k
p(1− δp) ) for k = 1, 2...
It is easy to see that c0k(p) < 0, limp→0 ck(p) =∞ for all k = 2, 3.... Note that
ck(p) = (ck−1(p)− (1− p)u)/δp > ck−1(p). (15)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. As a preliminary step we introduce some notation. I ik ∈ {0, 1} is an
indicator of the agent’s decision k periods before the deadline (at T − k), given that he has
worked i times before (i = 0, 1). It takes value 1 when the agent plans to work at T −k and 0
when he does not plan to work. Vk(i, p,B, Ik) denotes the agent’s present discounted expected
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payoﬀ prior to the realization of the uncertainty at T − k, given the number of periods in
which the agent previously worked, i, the probability of being distracted, p, the payoﬀ, B, and
his planned behavior from period T − k onwards, Ik = (Ik, Ik−1, .., I1), where It = {I0t , I1t }.
Vk(i, p,B, Ik) can be written as a convex combination of the continuation payoﬀ in case the
opportunity cost of time at T − k is high and the continuation payoﬀ in case it is low:
Vk(i, p,B, Ik) = (1− p)((1− I ik)u+ δVk−1(i+ I ik, p, B, Ik−1)) + pδVk−1(i, p,B, Ik−1). (16)
The solution to the agent’s decision problem at each time T − k, is the sequence Ik = {It}kt=1
that maximizes (16). Since the agent is time consistent, I∗k = (I
∗
k , I
∗
k−1) for all k = 0, 1, ...
Assume that sk(p) > B ≥ max[sk−1(p), sk+1(p)], then the three following inequalities hold
simultaneously:
0 + δVk(1, p, B, I∗k) ≥ u+ δVk(0, p, B, I∗k), (17)
0 + δVk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) < u+ δVk−1(0, p, B, I
∗
k−1), (18)
0 + δVk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2) ≥ u+ δVk−2(0, p, B, I∗k−2). (19)
Subtracting (18) from (17) we obtain that
Vk(1, p, B, I∗k)− Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) > Vk(0, p, B, I∗k)− Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1). (20)
By assumption the agent does not want to start k periods ahead of the deadline. Thus
Vk(0, p, B, I∗k) > (1− p)δVk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) + pδVk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1), (21)
and
Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1) = (1− p)δVk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2) + δpVk−2(0, p, B, I∗k−2), (22)
since by assumption he wants to start k − 1 periods ahead of the deadline. Substituting for
Vk(0, p, B, I∗k) in (20) by the RHS of (21) and for Vk−1(0, p, B, I
∗
k−1) by (22), the inequality in
(20) still holds,
Vk(1, p, B, I∗k)− Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) > δ(Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2)) (23)
+pδ(Vk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2)− Vk−2(0, p, B, I∗k−2))− pδ(Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1)).
a) Assume first that the agent is willing to complete k periods ahead of the deadline. Since
ck(p) > ck−i(p) for all i > 0, the agent also wants to finish in all consecutive occasions and
Vk(1, p, B, I∗k) = (1− p)Fk(p,B) + δpVk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) (24)
=
k−1X
i=0
δipi(1− p)Fk−i(p,B)
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Substituting for Vk(1, p, B, I∗k) and Vk−1(1, p, B, I
∗
k−1) in (23) by (24) and rearranging we get:
(1− p)(Fk(p,B)− Fk−1(p)) + (δp− δ)(Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2)) > (25)
δp(Vk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2)− Vk−2(0, p, B, I∗k−2)− δp(Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1))).
The RHS of (25) is positive, since Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) − Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1) < u/δ, and
Vk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2) − Vk−2(0, p, B, I∗k−2) ≥ u/δ. Substituting Fk(p,B) by (10) and
Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) by (24) in the LHS of (25) we obtain
(1− p)(Fk(p,B)− Fk−1(p,B)) + (δp− δ)(Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−2(1, p, B, I∗k−2)) =
(1− p)pk−2δk−1((1− p)u−B(1− pδ)),
which can only be positive if
B ≤ u 1− p
1− pδ <
u
δ
.
Since δB > u, the LHS of (25) cannot be positive. Hence, (17), (18) and (19) cannot hold
simultaneously if the agent wants to complete the task at T − k.
b) Assume now that the agent does not want to complete at T − k. We can now write
Vk(1, p, B, I∗k) as
Vk(1, p, B, I∗k) = (1− p)u+ δVk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1).
If Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) is subtracted from both sides, this allows us to write the inequality in
(20) as
(1− p)u− (1− δ)Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) > (26)
(1− p)u+ δVk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1),
where we have used the assumption that the agent does not want to start k periods ahead of
the deadline i.e., Vk(0, p, B, I∗k) = (1 − p)u + δVk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1). The inequality in (26) can
be re-written as
δ(Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1)) >
Vk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1)− Vk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1),
which cannot hold for δ < 1 and equations (17), (18) and (19) cannot hold simultaneously.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume that T − k is the last period the agent wants to start, i.e. k=
ks and that kc < ks − 1. The agent starts at T − k, whenever
δVk−1(1, p, B, I∗k−1) ≥ u+ δVk−1(0, p, B, I∗k−1),
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which can be written as
k−1−kcX
i=1
δi(1− p)u+ δk−kc
kc−1X
j=0
δjpj(1− p)Fkc−j(p,B) ≥ u+
k−1X
i=1
δi(1− p)u. (27)
Adding δk−1−k
c
u on both sides of (27) and simplifying we get
δk−1−k
c
(u+
kcX
j=1
δjpj−1(1− p)Fkc+1−j(p,B)−
kcX
i=1
δi(1− p)u) ≥ u(1 + δk−1−kc),
which using the LHS of (12) and (14) can be written as
δkpk
c
(ckc+1(p)−B) ≥ u(1 + δk−1−k
c
)− δkB. (28)
Since k = ks(p,B), the agent does not want to start at T − k − 1, and because T − kc is the
first period the agent wants to complete, it is the case that
δk−1pk
c
(ckc+1(p)−B) < u(1 + δk−2−k
c
)− δk−1B. (29)
A necessary condition for(28) and (29) to hold simultaneously is that
u(1 + δk−1−k
c
)− δkB < δ(u(1 + δk−2−kc)− δk−1B),
which is satisfied whenever
1 < δ.
This cannot hold, and hence kc + 1 ≥ ks.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the agent’s decision to start at T − k. If he starts, he
plans to complete at first when m ∈ {k−1, k−2, .., 1} periods remain. If he does not start, he
plans to start at the latest when n ∈ {k, k − 1, ..2} periods remain. Assume that m ≥ n− 1.
Let W sk (p,B,m) be the present value at T − k of starting and Wwk (p,B,m, n) the value of
postponing start (waiting) given that the opportunity cost at k is low, the first completion
date is T −m and last starting date T − n. The agent starts if B is such that
W sk (p,B,m) = L
s
k(p,m)u+ π
s
k(p,m)δ
kB ≥
Lwk (p,m, n)u+ π
w
k (p,m, n)δ
kB = Wwk (p,B,m, n)
where
πsk(p,m) = 1− pm (30)
is the probability that the agent completes a task if he starts it at T −k and plans to complete
at T −m at the earliest,
Lsk(p,m)u =
k−m−1X
i=1
δi(1− p)u+ δk−m
m−1X
j=0
δjpj(1− p)
m−j−1X
z=1
δz(1− p)u
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is the present value of leisure (ignoring u¯ realizations). Part of this leisure is enjoyed before
completion, and part is enjoyed after completion if the agent completes ahead of the deadline
πwk (p,m, n) =
k−nP
i=1
pi−1(1− p)πsk−i(p,min{m, k − i− 1}) (31)
is probability that the agent ever completes the project if he postpones start, and
Lwk (p,m, n)u = u+
k−nP
i=1
pi−1(1− p)δiLsk−i(p,min{m, k − i− 1})u+ pk−nδk−n
n−1P
i=1
δi(1− p)u
is the present expected value of leisure utility. Note that bothW sk (p,B,m) andW
w
k (p,B,m, n)
are linearly increasing in B. Moreover,
πsk(p,m) > π
w
k (p,m, n) and L
s
k(p,m)u < L
w
k (p,m, n)u.
Hence, there exist a unique B = bk(p,m, n), which makes W sk (p,B,m) and W
w
k (p,B,m, n)
equal:
bk(p,m, n) =
u
δk
Lwk (p,m, n)− Lsk(p,m)
∆πk(p,m, n)
. (32)
The numerator is the increase in leisure utility derived from postponement of start and the
denominator is the increase in the probability of completion due to starting at T − k rather
than waiting:
∆πk(p,m, n) = πsk(p,m)− πwk (p,m, n) (33)
= pk−m − pk−1 + (1− p)(m− n+ 1)pk−2.
Note first that b2(p, 1, 2) = s2(p) (eq. (3)). Furthermore
1. if B = bk(p,m, n) and m 6= min{kc(p,B), k − 1} = m∗k then B > bk(p,m∗k, n). If the
agent is indiﬀerent between starting at T − k and postponing when he is completing
at suboptimal dates, i.e. then he must prefer to start when his completion strategy is
optimal,
2. if B = bk(p,m∗k, n) and n 6= ks(p,B) = n∗ then bk(p,m∗k, n∗) > B: If the agent is
indiﬀerent between starting and postponing start, given that he will complete at optimal
dates, but that he would start at suboptimal dates, n 6= ks(p,B), then he must strictly
prefer to postpone, given that he would both start and complete at optimal dates in the
future.
It follows 1, 2 and Lemma 2 that the agent will start k periods ahead of the deadline if
B ≥ max
n∈{k,k−1,..2}
min
m∈{k−1,..n−1}
bk(p,m, n) = sk(p).
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For k ≥ 3, sk(p) is U-shaped with limp→0 sk(p) =∞ and limp→1 sk(p) =∞. This follows
from the fact that bk(p,m, n) is U-shaped with limp→0 bk(p,m, n) =∞ for all n < k and
limp→1 bk(p,m, n) =∞ for all n ≤ k.
3. sk(p) > sk−1(p) for all p and all k if δ ≤ 1/2. This follows from the fact that s3(p) > s2(p)
for all p when δ ≤ 1/2 and from corollary 1, i).
4. For k, n ≥ 3, bk(p,m, n) can be written as
bk(p,m, n) =
bk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)
δ
∆πk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)
∆πk(p,m, n)
+ (34)
u(1− p)
δ
(p− (1− p)(m− n+ 1))pk−3
∆πk(p,m, n)
since
Lsk(p,m)u = L
s
k−1(p,m− 1)u+ πsk−1(p,m− 1)(1− p)δk−1u, (35)
Lwk (p,m, n)u = L
w
k−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)u+
πwk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)(1− p)δk−1u+ pk−n(1− p)δk−1u, (36)
and
pk−n −∆πk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1) = (p− (1− p)(m− n+ 1))pk−3. (37)
Corollary 1 implies that if sk(p) < sk−1(p), then sk(p) = bk(p, k − 1, k) and sk−1(p) =
bk−1(p, k − 2, k − 1). Substituting m = k, and n = m− 1 in (34),
bk(p, k − 1, k) =
bk−1(p, k − 2, k − 1)
δ
1− pk−2
1− pk−1 .
bk(p, k − 1, k) < bk−1(p, k − 2, k − 1) whenever
δ >
1− pk−2
1− pk−1 =
Pk−3
i=0 p
iPk−2
i=0 pi
. (38)
It is easy to see that (38) holds for large enough p0s, provided that
δ >
k − 2
k − 1 =
Pk−3
i=0 1
iPk−2
i=0 1
i
.
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Proof of Proposition 3. i) and ii) follow directly from (5). iii) It follows from (5), that,
given B, πT (p,B) is continuously decreasing in p whenever changes in p do not involve changes
in the agent’s starting and completing decisions.
Assume B > sk(p) for some k ∈ {3, ..T} and some p and let pk(B) be the smallest of the two
solutions in (0, 1) to
B = sk(p).
Since sk(p) is U-shaped, we can find an arbitrarily small  > 0 such thatB < sk(pk(B)−). The
set of dates in which the agent is willing to start is larger for p = pk(B) than for p = pk(B)−,
with all other decisions remaining unchanged. It follows from (5) that πT (pk(B) − , B) <
πT (pk(B), B).
Proof of Proposition 4. Let cSk (p, q) denote the complete condition when the stochastic
deadline is k periods away. Assume that B > cSk−i(p, q) for i = 1, 2..k − 1. The agent will
complete k periods ahead of the deadline when
Fk(p,B) ≥ u+ Lsk(p, k − 1)u+ pk−2(1− p)(1− q)δk−1u+
(1− pk−2 + pk−2(1− p)q)δkB.
With a deterministic deadline the agent would have finished in the last period had he experi-
enced k− 2 periods of high opportunity cost. With the stochastic deadline he cannot work in
the last period with probability (1 − q). The above expression can be re-arranged to obtain
the following complete condition
B ≥ p ck(p)
1− (1− p)q +
(1− q)(1− p)u
δ(1− (1− p)q) = c
S
k (p, q).
Note that cSk (p, 1) = ck(p). It follows from (15) that c
S
k (p, 0) = ck−1(p)/δ. Moreover c
S
k (p, q) >
cSk−1(p, q) and ∂c
S
k (p, q)/∂q > 0. The agent is more willing to complete when the deadline is
stochastic.
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume that the deadline is stochastic at T and that the agent
considers starting k ≥ 3 periods before the deadline. If he starts, he plans to complete at first
when m ∈ {k − 1, k − 2, .., 1} periods remain . If he does not start , he plans to start at the
latest when n ∈ {k, k − 1, ..2} periods remain. The agent is willing to start at T − k if
qW sk (p,B,m) + (1− q)(W sk−1(p, δB,m− 1) + (1− p)δk−1u) (39)
≥ qWwk (p,B,m, n) + (1− q)(WWk−1(p, δB,m− 1, n− 1) + (1− p)δk−1u)
The agent will start when B ≥ bSk (p,m, n, q)
B ≥ bSk (p,m, n, q) = q
u
δk
Lwk (p,m, n)− Lsk(p,m)
q∆πk(p,m, n) + (1− q)∆πk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)
+ (40)
(1− q) u
δk
Lwk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)− Lsk−1(p,m− 1)
q∆πk(p,m, n) + (1− q)∆πk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)
.
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Note that
∂bsk(p,m, n, q)
∂q
=
(1− p)(bsk(p,m, n, q)− u/δ)((1− p)(m− n+ 1)− p)pk−3
q∆πk(p,m, n) + (1− q)∆πk−1(p,m− 1, n− 1)
where we have used (35), (36), and (37). Since bsk(p,m, n, q) > u/δ,the derivative is positive
(negative) whenever
p S m− n+ 1
m− n+ 2 = p(m,n).
Note that since m ≥ n− 1, p(m,n) ≥ 0.
Let mk(p, q) and nk(p, q) solve
max
n∈{k,k−1,..2}
min
m∈{k−1,..n−1}
bk(p,m, n, q). (41)
The agent will start k periods ahead of the deadline if
B ≥ bk(p,mk(p, q),mk(p, q), q) = ssk(p, q).
Proof of proposition 5. If k is the last period the agent wants to start, sk(p, q) =
bk(p, k − 1, k, q), and decreases in q lead to increases in sk(p, q). Whenever m(q) ≥ n(q)− 1,
decreases in q lead to decreases in sk, provided p is small enough.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume the first period the agent is willing to start with a
deterministic deadline T periods away is when T−1 periods remain, i.e. sT (p) > B > sT−1(p).
The total probability of completion is
πT (p,B) = πT−1(p,B).
If the stochastic deadline motivates early undertaking, i.e. B > ssT (p, q) the total probability
of completing, πST (p,B, q), is
πST (p,B, q) = πT−1(p,B) + γq(1− p) > πT−1(p,B),
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that the agent has started, but not completed by t = T −1.
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